That Damn Ockham: Chapter Two of 'Science and Religion 1450-1900'

Chapter two of Olson's book (I introduced it here) is just as good as Chapter one. Olson accurately describes Aristotle's philosophy, and that it is was widely accepted in the later Medieval years. From there, he describes the movement against it. Typically, people think that Aristotle's philosophy was abandoned in favor of mechanical philosophy, but a truer analysis shows that it was firstly resisted for more theological reasons than a transition to mechanical philosophy itself. Olson points to two theological reasons.


Firstly, the heretical sect called the millenarians pushed against Aristotle's dismissal of practical knowledge. Productive labor and arts were celebrated and associated with God's plan for mankind. In fact, natural knowledge of this sort was supposed to be cultivated as a necessary condition of perfection within the world--a condition necessary to overcome to Antichrist.

Secondly, the necessity Aristotle prescribed to theoretical science was thought to restrict the freedom (and hence omnipotence) of God. Thinkers such as Ockham (I really hate him)emphasized a voluntarist theology wherein God's will cannot be restricted by Aristotelian natures; and moreover, God's will is unfathomable and His power unrestricted; and hence, causes in the Aristotelian sense cannot be true, let alone known by men. Instead, argued Ockham, we need to focus on how events occur. On this analysis, that is, that of Ockham's, our scientific knowledge is therefore limited to the empirical. For if God's will and intentions cannot be known, and He is unrestricted in His omnipotence, then our physical knowledge must be contingently known, and it must be based upon what we learn through experience. The basis for empiricism, nominalism and ideas against necessary connections is found right here, concerned, in part, with the theological. Olson states:

"Many characteristics of modern science emerged out of nominalist philosophy. These include the abandonment of attempts to answer the question of why things happen in favor of describing how things happen, usually through mathematical "laws"....Thus, in an ironic way, a conservative religious argument gave strong impetus to modern ways of doing science." (Page 34)

There's plenty more to say on this chapter, but nothing that captures my interest enough to write about it here. If you're looking for a fuller treatment on the development of modern science, and its philosophy, I push you to read this chapter.