The Moderns and Mechanical Philosophy: A Rant on the Drama Queens of Philosophy

(Some notes from my readings)


The Moderns: A Rant on the Drama Queens of Philosophy

The moderns were all in the rage about Aristotle's philosophy, particularly his formal and efficient causes. In place of these causes, nature was construed in strictly mechanical and quantifiable terms: there are no purposes, powers, telos, natures, necessary connections, nor anything of that sort, just blind laws of nature ruling over particles and such, or at least as insofar as we can determine. Now of course it appears as though nature is not mechanical, but that appearance is a function of the human mind looking onto things for which it has no real extension-projections and habits of the mind (Hume, I am looking at you here!), or perhaps even the mind's necessary conditions of understanding (Hi, Kant!). Either way, it's like, just in your mind, dude.

Here though, in their dance and denial, the moderns become drama queens, the creators of problems which would not otherwise exist. I present a few here.

The Problem of Induction

With the denial or neglect of formal and efficient causation, and with Hume's attack on our ideas of necessary connection, causes are flimsy, loose and without known necessity. There is no objective reason that A causes B and not anything else, even not-B. Likewise, there is no objective reason why B needs to follow A. Thus, how can we know that the future will resemble the past? How can we know that the things we observe now will be like those we see later? On modern, mechanistic philosophy, we can't. Humbled, we are supposed to shake Hume's hand for showing us the limitations of our thought, or so the story goes. Gee, thanks, Hume! You're awesome.

Or not. A pre-modern would just point out that Hume's ridiculous problem is a result of denying causation in the way of Aristotle had it. Essences and forms of things themselves will guarantee their identity in the future, and we can be just as sure that causal processes will be definite and ordered in light of the ends, forms, and the powers of things themselves. Our knowledge is secured within things themselves.

Human Rights, and the Is-Ought 'Fallacy'

If there is no form or essence, and if there is no final cause in the world, there can be no objective measure for which we can judge a person, thing or action. Value becomes subjective, it is not of the natural order, it is relative to the persons doing the valuing. We can learn what we ought to do relative to the values we hold, but not what we ought to value, ultimately, and independently of what we actually value. Thus, in the absence of forms, essences, and of final causation, there is no objective value out there in the world itself. Thus, we have Hume's so-called fallacy, and it is a valid concern given the machinery of his philosophy, all the more reason to reject it.

Furthermore: when we give ourselves to Hume in this way, there is no clear, objective way to support human rights (in the moral sense). Locke saw this, and so he made the weird argument that we are God's properties; and hence interfering with our liberty, property or life is a violation against God's rights. Of course those rights are not derivative to us, but to God alone, and that hardly seems sufficient to predicate our human rights. The difficult task here is plausibly accounting for human rights without referring to or anchoring in natural order. Ask yourself: Why should humans have rights? Why is it that we give fewer moral rights to non-human animals (if any at all)? Why do we not give any moral rights to rocks?

Answering these questions without reference to natural orders, and without reference to an order of being, is remarkably difficult, at least if we aim to give a plausible answer. Less ambitious philosophers decided to give up the project altogether (Hobbes, and arguably Hume), I applaud their honesty,