Christianity, Faith and Reason

Faith, Reason and Christianities

Do Christians argue for their beliefs? Is it all a bunch of fideism?

Jesus was not a philosopher; Jesus did not occupy a seat at the Greek schools, nor did he write an apology (defense) for his views, nor did he write a systematic rebuttal of other views. Jesus did not send his disciples out into the world to cognate philosophical systems, nor did he send them out to tackle Christianity’s pagan critiques with apologies. Christianity, as given by Jesus, was a revealed religion, and he sent his disciples out into the world to preach; he sent them to lead the world to God through practice rather than speculative reason. I do not mean to suggest that Jesus was strictly against speculative reason or that he prohibited philosophical defenses and critiques, but only that he did not explicitly send his disciples out into the world with those tools. They were to convert the world, that’s all.

Conversion, however, did not come easy. From the Jews, Christians faced theological attacks, and those attacks had to be met for the viability of Christianity amongst the Jews. From the pagans, Christianity faced philosophical and political attacks, and these attacks had to be met too. Thus, in order to defend and propagate Christianity, a necessary condition of any viable effort to Christianize the world, the Christians had to make their own arguments. But since early Christians neither had a philosophy, logic nor rhetoric of their own, they borrowed much from some of the prevailing philosophies of their day: Platonism, Neo-Platonism and Stoicism. And from the fruits of these philosophies, Christians defended their beliefs and attacked those of others; and from the fruits these philosophies, Christians penetrated the dogmas of their own faith so that they might understand it better (an anticipation of Credo, ut intelligam).

Regrettably, not all Christians were on board with the practice of borrowing from the pagans (Tertullian, for instance), for these Christians viewed Greek philosophy with hostility—Greeks systems were thought to be competitors and rivals to Christianity not just in what they believed, but in the worldly ways they came to believe it. Thankfully, the thought of men like Clement of Alexandria (and Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Marcianus Aristides, etc.) did not rescind upon challenge: Greek thought and reason itself was embraced by many Christians as gifts from God, and men like St. Augustine made it their goal to baptize Greek thought and thereupon produce a Christian Weltanschauung (a comprehensive view of the world and human life).

Thus, we see many Christians (St. Irenaeus and Minucius Felix, to name two among many) argue for some of the truths of Christianity, particularly those concerning the existence of God. That is, these Christians argue that God can be known to exist through his works, or movement (change), or other phenomena; and from Origen (yet another well lettered Christian), we see arguments as to why God cannot be the author of evil.

Early Christians argued for many of their positions, and they used philosophy and speculative reason to better understand and defend Christian belief, and that remains to be the case today. This fact is enough to show contempt towards the new atheists and their ilk who wish to portray every Christian belief in general as some sort of fideism. Heck, these atheists seem completely ignorant of the fact that a Catholic person can be ejected from the Church for proclaiming that God’s existence cannot be proven through His works! Is that fideism? I think not.

I do not mean to suggest that every Christian belief could be proven true through philosophic speculation or reason alone, no Christian thinker believes that, so far as I know. I also do not mean to suggest that a Christian needs to believe even some Christian beliefs based upon reason or philosophy. But what I am saying is that at least some Christianities, say, Catholicism, do not shy away from philosophical debate; and I am also saying that some Christianities, again, Catholicism, neither adhere to fideism nor allow for any of its positions, dogma and doctrinal statements to be understood as irrational, unreasonable or stupid.

But in what way is faith rational?

That answer might vary upon the thinker you ask. If you ask Benedict XVI, he would likely clarify that faith in the Creed is not to be understood on the same plane as practical knowledge, that is, speculative reason, scientific knowledge, the measurable, and so on. He would likely argue that there are different planes of belief and understanding. Like Bonaventure, Benedict would point out that we cannot measure ourselves like we do everything else, we must take a stand in or assent to meaning—a meaning that upholds and gives ground to everything else from which with we can give meaning to the world, our existence and existence as such. Assents of this sort are rocks for which human beings stand upon, and without which no calculable knowledge can be derived, for we can only do this from the context of meaning. And this is not assent to the irrational; it is a movement towards truth and knowledge, for truth and knowledge cannot be attained (by men) without assent of this sort, for there would be neither context nor meaning behind them.

Thus, for Benedict XVI, faith (assent to or stand in meaning) is neither irrational nor subsumed into practical knowledge—it might be better understood as supra-rational. It is to take a stand in the greater existential questions, ones which cannot be ascertained by practical knowledge, but yet provide the context for that knowledge; and hence just as we interpret the world from the light of the Sun or erect ourselves upon the rocks beneath our feet, we assent to and trust in the Creed to make sense of everything else, ourselves included.

That’s some deep shit. Admittedly, his point is hard to grasp, and I am unsure if I understood it entirely, but that is because His Holiness writes from a pre-modern perspective, and I should also add that his perspective seems influenced by Continental philosophy, something I have great difficulty penetrating. You should see me interpret Hegel—yikes! Nevertheless, His Holiness believes that to take faith in the Creed is to take a stand in a far deeper existential issue, one of meaning; and he does not believe, contra Sartre, that human beings can make their own meaning, nor can they subsume this issue into one of practical knowledge.

I hesitate to criticize Benedict, as I am not entirely confident in my interpretation of his writings. However, unless I have missed something within the source of my information (Introduction to Christianity), he said nothing which would justify the Christian faith over some other thing, say, Islam. That is, even if it were true that meaning must be taken as faith, that does not suggest that it should be Christian—why not Hinduism, Islam or Judaism? Perhaps Benedict only meant to answer the more general question: Can faith rational? I will have to delve deeper into his thought to determine this.

In answer to the particular, that concerning the rationality of Christian faith, perhaps it is permissible to turn to St. Thomas Aquinas. On the intellectual account of Thomist faith, albeit this might be a superficial reading, faith is a sort of assent to authority. Through argument we can see that God exists, that He is perfectly good, goodness itself, omniscient, etc. and through the verification of some of the miraculous within revelation, we assent to the rest of that which is revealed. Thus, we have good reason to trust in revelation.

 There is some truth to this reading of Thomas, but it is overly simplistic. Soon I will write a comprehensive account of Thomas' understanding of faith and reason, though I want to stress that the a priori understandings of faith in general as contrary to reason is not just unhistorical, it is just dumb and superficial. Skeptics need to look into the writings of Aquinas and many other theologicians to determine just what Christians, especially our elite, believe faith to be rather than spit their ill informed caricatures.